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“STRIKE TWO, YOU’RE OUT!” 
THE NEED FOR A MORE STRINGENT DRUG 
POLICY IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
 
ZACKARY KESSINGER* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 As the song goes, “for it’s one, two, three strikes, you’re out, at the old 
ball game.”1 Major League Baseball (“MLB”), one of the “Big Four” 
professional sports leagues in the United States and Canada,2 has 
experienced significant growth over the years in attendance and annual 
revenue. For example, total MLB ballpark attendance increased from over 
forty-six million fans in 1985,3 to over seventy-three million fans in 2015,4 
with league revenues approaching $9.5 billion entering the 2016 season.5 
However, as MLB’s popularity has grown, so too has the number of players 
using performance-enhancing drugs (“PEDs”)6 like anabolic steroids and 
human growth hormone (“hGH”). The notorious “Steroid Era” of baseball, 
which began in the 1980s, resulted in “increased offensive output 
throughout the game” where “a number of players were believed to have 
used [PEDs].”7  
This Note argues that MLB should adopt a more stringent drug policy 
than the one currently set forth in MLB’s Joint Drug Prevention and 
Treatment Program8 for two reasons. First, the increasing prevalence of 
PED use among MLB players threatens baseball’s integrity. Second, 
professional players’ PED use may encourage aspiring young athletes to 
abuse PEDs, which may harm their long-term health.  
Part I provides a historical overview of the development of MLB’s 
 
 
* J.D. CANDIDATE, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW CLASS OF 2018. 
1
 JACK NORWORTH, TAKE ME OUT TO THE BALL GAME (York Music Co. 1908). 
2 The “Big Four” is comprised of Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League 
(NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), and the National Hockey League (NHL). 
3 1980-1989 Ballpark Attendance, BALLPARKSOFBASEBALL.COM, 
http://ballparksofbaseball.com/1980-89attendance.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2016).  
4 Maury Brown, MLB Sees Nearly 73.8 Million in Attendance for 2015, Seventh-Highest All-Time, 
FORBES (Dec. 4, 2015, 4:40 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2015/12/04/mlb-sees-
record-revenues-for-2015-up-500-million-and-approaching-9-5-billion/#1afc282e3e0e. 
5 Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record Revenues for 2015, Up $500 Million and Approaching $9.5 
Billion, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2015/12/04/mlb-sees-record-revenues-for-
2015-up-500-million-and-approaching-9-5-billion/#61f90eb52307 (last visited Oct. 18, 2016). 
6 PEDs are also commonly referred to as “performance-enhancing substances,” or “PES.” For the 
sake of clarity, this Note will refer to such banned substances as “PEDs.” 
7 The Steroids Era, ESPN (Dec. 5, 2012, 4:23 PM), http://www.espn.com/mlb/topics/_/page/the-
steroids-era.  
8 Major League Baseball’s Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, MLBPLAYERS.COM, 
http://www.mlbplayers.com/pdf9/5450924.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2018).  
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drug policy and discusses the investigative “Mitchell Report” of 2007.9 Part 
II discusses examples of notable former and current MLB players who were 
accused of using PEDs during their professional careers, including 
references to such players’ court decisions, complaints, indictments, plea 
bargains, and testimonies before congressional committees. Part III 
examines statistical information gathered from surveys conducted regarding 
the prevalence of adolescents’ use of PEDs in the United States. Part IV 
reviews the retributive and consequentialist theories of punishment and 
provides a framework for analyzing different philosophical methodologies 
concerning punishment, including Kantianism and utilitarianism. Part V 
proposes a “two-strike” solution for developing a more stringent drug policy 
and applies these philosophical approaches to MLB players’ use of PEDs. 
Finally, Part VI identifies and addresses potential challenges and issues that 
may arise from the proposed solution.  
 
I.  MLB’S DRUG POLICY CONTINUES TO EVOLVE OVER TIME 
 
In 1984, MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn responded to the surge in 
PED abuse by urging “stronger regulation of drug use in baseball.”10 MLB 
club owners disagreed over whether to “require mandatory drug testing as 
part of such a program,”11 whereas the Major League Baseball Players 
Association (“MLBPA”) opposed such mandatory testing as “degrading to 
players and a violation of their privacy.”12 In June 1984, the owners and the 
MLBPA agreed to a joint drug program that “provided for treatment of 
players who were found to use, or who had admitted using, certain drugs of 
abuse.” However, this program did not include steroids or amphetamines on 
the list of banned substances.13  
The 1984 joint drug program tested players who “admitted to drug use, 
and for players for whom there was ‘reason to believe’ that they were using 
drugs.”14 Such “reason to believe” testing was allowed if “a three-member 
panel unanimously determined that testing was warranted” for a player 
suspected of using drugs.15 Although players who failed drug tests were not 
punished under the drug program, they were subject to discipline if they 
“failed to cooperate under the program.”16 However, in October 1985, the 
 
 
9 George J. Mitchell, Report to the Commissioner of Baseball of an Independent Investigation into 
the Illegal Use of Steroids and Other Performance Enhancing Substances by Players in Major League 
Baseball, MLB.COM (2007), http://files.mlb.com/mitchrpt.pdf. This document is hereinafter referred to 
as the “Mitchell Report.” 
10 Id. at 34. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. (quoting then-MLBPA Executive Director, Don Fehr). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 34-35.  
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owners terminated the joint drug program, which was “criticized by some 
as insufficiently rigorous” and “largely ignored,” since only three players 
had submitted to the program’s treatment and rehabilitation services.17 
In 1994, during collective bargaining discussions between MLB and 
the MLBPA that included a lengthy strike, then-Commissioner Allan “Bud” 
Selig proposed “to [the MLBPA] a joint drug program that included steroids 
as prohibited substances.”18 However, the MLBPA was “fiercely and 
steadfastly opposed to any form of drug testing,”19 due to concerns about 
respecting players’ “legitimate privacy and due process rights.”20 
Consequently, a lack of any drug prevention policy or testing program in 
MLB contributed to players’ increased use of PEDs leading up to the next 
round of collective bargaining in 2002.21 
 In August 2002, owners and the MLBPA announced a new collective 
bargaining agreement that “include[d] a joint drug program for the first time 
since October 1985.”22 The program called for “survey urine test[s] for 
banned steroids in 2003 and 2004, and if more than [five] percent of tests 
[were] positive [following] [one] year [of testing],”23 then “tougher testing 
would be implemented with penalties ranging from counseling for a [first-
time] offense, to a [maximum] one-year suspension for a fifth violation.”24 
However, the testing would be dropped if “less than [two and a half] percent 
[of players] test[ed] positive in two consecutive years.”25 
 In November 2003, MLB revealed that between five and seven percent 
of 1,438 tests, which were anonymously conducted on a random sample of 
players from each club’s forty-man roster during the 2003 season, returned 
 
 
17 Id. at 36. 
18 The Mitchell Report: The Illegal Use of Steroids in Major League Baseball: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 101 (2008) (Statement of Allan H. Selig, 
Comm’r, Major League Baseball).  
19 Id. 
20 The Mitchell Report: The Illegal Use of Steroids in Major League Baseball: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 24 (2008) (Statement of Hon. George J. 
Mitchell, former U.S. Sen.). 
21 Selig, supra note 18, at 101. It is important to note that MLB’s drug policy has “prohibited the 
use of any prescription medication without a valid prescription” since 1971. See The Mitchell Report, 
supra note 9, at SR-10 to -11. Although steroids were included on MLB’s banned substances list since 
1971, players were not disciplined for steroid use until the 2002 collective bargaining agreement. 
Evidence suggested that players were obtaining PEDs through so-called “rejuvenation” or “anti-aging” 
centers using prescriptions with “doubtful validity” from physicians who failed to have face-to-face 
interactions with their player customers. See id. at SR-2 to -3, -36. 
22 A Timeline of MLB’s Drug-testing Rules, USA TODAY (Mar. 28, 2014, 4:55 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2014/03/28/a-timeline-of-mlbs-drug-testing-rules/7024351.  
23 Id. 
24 See ESPN, supra note 7. 
25 Id. 
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positive results.26 Because the five percent threshold had been surpassed, 
Commissioner Selig announced that “mandatory testing for steroids use 
would begin in the spring of 2004.”27 Additionally, MLB announced the 
following penalties for subsequent drug offenders: a first violation would 
result in treatment; a second violation would result in a fifteen-day 
suspension without pay or a fine of up to $10,000; a third violation would 
result in a twenty-five-day suspension or a fine of up to $25,000; a fourth 
violation would result in a fifty-day suspension or a fine of up to $50,000; 
and a fifth violation would result in a one-year suspension or a fine of up to 
$100,000.28 Under the 2004 policy, “[a]ll major league players would be 
subject to two tests (without prior notice)…[consisting of] an initial test, 
and a follow-up test five to seven days later,”29 as hGH can remain in one’s 
body for as little as a few hours, while steroids can remain in the body for 
up to several weeks. 
 Faced with congressional pressure to intensify the drug program, in 
January 2005, MLB and the MLBPA added seventeen new banned 
substances to the drug program, including hGH.30 They also announced 
more stringent punishments for drug offenders: a first violation would result 
in a ten-day suspension; a second violation would result in a thirty-day 
suspension; a third violation would result in a sixty-day suspension; a fourth 
violation would result in a one-year ban; and a fifth violation would be 
subject to discipline at the Commissioner’s discretion.31 In November 2005, 
MLB and the MLBPA further agreed to add stimulants like amphetamines 
to the banned substances list and to adopt harsher punishments for drug 
violations, including “a [fifty]-game suspension for first-time offenders, a 
[one hundred]-game suspension for second-time offenders, and a permanent 
ban for third-time offenders.”32  
 
A. The Mitchell Report 
 
 In March 2006, Commissioner Selig appointed former Senator George 
J. Mitchell to “conduct a comprehensive investigation of the illegal use of 
 
 
26 Id. In his statement before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on 
January 15, 2008, Commissioner Selig stated that ninety-six players, or approximately 6.67%, tested 
positive during the 2003 survey-testing period. See Selig, supra note 18, at 92. See also The Mitchell 
Report, supra note 9, at SR-2. 
27 See ESPN, supra note 7. 
28 See USA TODAY, supra note 22. 
29 See ESPN, supra note 7. A Health Policy and Advisory Committee conducted the testing, which 
included members from both MLB and the MLBPA. Pursuant to the 2002 collective bargaining 
agreement, “all anabolic steroids deemed illegal by the [FDA] were subject to testing.” Id. 
30 Selig, supra note 18, at 93. 
31 See USA TODAY, supra note 22. 
32 Selig, supra note 18, at 93. Penalties where a third violation results in a lifetime ban are 
commonly referred to as “three strikes and you’re out” penalties. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss2/9
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[PEDs] in [MLB].”33 Twenty-one months later in December 2007, after 
reviewing over 135,000 pages of documents collected from both the 
Commissioner’s Office and all thirty clubs, and interviewing more than 700 
witnesses in the United States, Canada, and the Dominican Republic,34 
Mitchell documented his findings and provided recommendations to the 
Commissioner in what is commonly known as the “Mitchell Report.”35  
 Mitchell concluded that players’ illegal use of PEDs “poses a serious 
threat to the integrity of the game.”36 The ubiquitous use of PEDs among 
players not only “unfairly disadvantages the honest athletes who refuse to 
use [PEDs],” but also “raises questions about the validity of baseball 
records.”37 Additionally, Mitchell stated that the use of PEDs “victimizes 
the majority of players who do not use [PEDs]…” because these “clean 
athletes” face three alternatives: “(1) compete without [using PEDs], 
knowing that they may lose to competitors with fewer scruples; (2) abandon 
their quest because they are unwilling to use [PEDs] to achieve a decisive 
competitive advantage; or (3) use [PEDs] to level the playing field.”38 
Furthermore, because such use of PEDs is illegal, PED users are “vulnerable 
to drug dealers who might seek to exploit [MLB players’] knowledge 
through threats intended to affect the outcome of baseball games or 
otherwise.”39 For instance, drug dealers who have knowledge that certain 
MLB players are consuming PEDs could attempt to blackmail these players 
by requiring that they deliberately lose games in exchange for the dealers’ 
continued silence regarding the players’ illegal conduct. 
 The Report also highlighted the troubling reality that professional 
 
 
33 Id. at 91.  
34 The Mitchell Report, supra note 9, at SR-6.  
35 Id. 
36 Id. at SR-8. Mitchell noted that the use of PEDs among players during the “Steroid Era” was not 
an “isolated problem involving just a few players or a few clubs,” but rather, “each of the thirty clubs 
has had players who have been involved with [PEDs] at some time in their careers.” Id. at SR-1. For 
example, former player Ken Caminiti estimated that approximately half of all players in MLB were 
abusing anabolic steroids in 2002, and former coach Dave McKay estimated that at one point 
approximately thirty percent of players were using steroids. See SR-2. Mitchell ultimately attributed the 
emergence and proliferation of the “Steroid Era” to the collective failure of the Commissioner’s Office, 
club officials, the MLBPA, and players to “deal with [the issue of PEDs] early on.” Id. at SR-36.  
37 Id. at SR-8. Several former players believed that “it was grossly unfair that some players were 
using [PEDs] to gain an advantage” and commonly complained that players who were using steroids 
were “taking [their roster spots].” Id. at SR-10. Players who used PEDs “violated federal law and 
baseball policy, and they distorted the fairness of competition by trying to gain an unfair advantage over 
the majority of players who followed the law and the rules.” Id. at SR-36. The implicated federal law is 
the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1970), 
 which now includes anabolic steroids as a controlled substance. See id. at SR-10. 
38 Id. at SR-9 to -10. 
39 Id. at SR-8. 
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players’ use of PEDs encourages younger athletes to use the substances, 
placing them at “risk of serious harm.”40 According to a 2006 National 
Institute on Drug Abuse survey, approximately three to six percent of high 
school students in the United States, or “hundreds of thousands of [high 
school students],” were using steroids illegally.41 Moreover, Mitchell 
warned that the abuse of PEDs “can have more serious [health] effects on 
[adolescents] than…on adults” because “adolescents are already subject to 
significant hormonal changes.”42 For example, steroid users risk developing 
“psychiatric problems, cardiovascular and liver damage, drastic changes to 
their reproductive systems, musculoskeletal injury, and other problems.”43 
Similarly, hGH users risk developing “cancer, harm to their reproductive 
health, cardiac and thyroid problems, and overgrowth of bone and 
connective tissue.”44 To illustrate, Don Hooton, founder of the Taylor 
Hooton Foundation for Fighting Steroid Abuse and whose seventeen-year-
old son committed suicide after abusing anabolic steroids, testified before 
the House Committee on Government Reform in 2005:  
 
I believe the poor example being set by professional athletes is a 
major catalyst fueling the high usage of steroids amongst our kids. 
Our kids look up to these guys. They want to do the things the pros 
do to be successful…Our youngsters hear the message loud and 
clear, and it’s wrong. “If you would want to achieve your goal, it’s 
OK to use steroids to get you there, because the pros are doing it.” 
It’s a real challenge for parents to overpower the strong message 
that’s being sent to our children by [MLB players’] behavior.45 
 
 Additionally, Mitchell provided information regarding the number of 
players who tested positive for PEDs from 2003 to 2007. First, Mitchell 
confirmed that “between [five] and [seven] percent of major league players 
who participated in anonymous survey testing in 2003 tested positive for 
[PEDs].”46 However, Mitchell noted that these figures “understated the 
actual level of use since players knew they would be tested at some time 
during the year, the use of [hGH] was not detectable in the [urine] tests that 
 
 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at SR-8 to -9.  
42 Id. at SR-8.  
43 Id. See also Indictment at 3, United States v. Clemens, 793 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 
CR-10-223) (stating that the negative side effects of using anabolic steroids include “liver damage, heart 
damage, kidney damage, cancer, circulation problems, and psychiatric conditions such as mania”). 
44 Id. See also id. at 4 (stating that the negative side effects of using hGH include “cancer, 
circulatory problems, heart enlargement and damage, liver damage, hypothyroidism, acromegaly, 
impotence in men, and menstrual irregularities in women”). 
45 Id. at SR-9. 
46 Id. at SR-2. 
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2018]      MORE STRINGENT DRUG POLICY IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL       263 
 
 
 
 
were conducted, and…a negative test does not necessarily mean that a 
player has not been using [PEDs].”47 In 2004, following the institution of 
mandatory drug testing in MLB, there were “[twelve] undisputed positive 
tests for steroids.”48 In 2005, when hGH was added to MLB’s list of banned 
substances, “[twelve] players tested positive for steroids and were 
suspended for ten days.”49 In 2006, “two players tested positive for steroids 
and were suspended for [fifty] games.”50 Lastly, in 2007, “three players 
were suspended for [fifty] games each for positive steroid tests.”51 
 Mitchell concluded the Report by providing five key recommendations 
to Commissioner Selig as to how to effectively combat the widespread use 
of PEDs in MLB. First, Mitchell advised that in order to “investigate 
vigorously allegations of [PED] violations,” the Commissioner should 
“create a Department of Investigations, led by a senior executive who 
reports directly to the president of [MLB], to respond promptly and 
aggressively to allegations of the illegal use or possession of [PEDs].”52 
Second, Mitchell recommended that MLB improve its procedures to “keep 
illegal substances out of major league clubhouses.”53 For example, because 
evidence suggested that players were receiving shipments of PEDs to their 
clubs’ facilities, Mitchell suggested that “packages delivered to players 
through their clubs should be logged and tracked.”54 Furthermore, clubs 
were advised to “adopt policies to ensure that allegations of a player’s 
possession or use of [PEDs] are reported promptly to the Department of 
Investigations.”55 Third, Mitchell called for MLB to improve its educational 
programs by providing players with educational materials regarding the 
“side effects of [PED] use and the deleterious health effects of long-term 
use,” along with “…education on how to achieve the same results [instead 
of using PEDs] through proper training, nutrition, and supplements that are 
legal and safe…[and] the risks associated with buying black market 
 
 
47 Id. Players transitioned from using steroids to taking hGH not only because hGH was 
undetectable in urine tests at the time, but also because players believed hGH assisted “their ability to 
recover from injuries and fatigue during the long baseball season.” Id.  
48 Id. at SR-13.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at SR-29. Mitchell noted that such investigator’s success “depends in part upon his interaction 
with law enforcement officials who in the course of their own investigations obtain evidence of athletes’ 
possession or use of illegal substances that, under appropriate circumstances, can be shared with sports 
leagues.” Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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drugs…[due to PEDs’] “unknown nature and origin.”56 Fourth, Mitchell 
urged MLB and the MLBPA to incorporate a “state-of-the-art drug testing 
program” into MLB’s joint drug program following the next collective 
bargaining discussions in 2011 that would “continue to respect the 
legitimate privacy and due process rights of the players.”57 Finally, Mitchell 
cautioned that “[p]layers also should be reminded of their responsibilities 
as role models to young athletes, who in emulating major league players’ 
illegal substance use will place themselves at risk.”58  
 In January 2008, just weeks following the release of the Mitchell 
Report, MLB adopted the recommendations set forth in the Mitchell Report 
and issued written policies that:  
(i) require[d] all Clubs to adopt a uniform, written policy for 
reporting information about possible substance abuse violations 
and certify to the Commissioner’s Office that such policies have 
been complied with; (ii) require[d] all Major and Minor League 
Clubs to establish a system to log every package sent to players at 
its facilities; (iii) require[d] background checks to be performed on 
all Clubhouse personnel; and (iv) require[d] all Clubhouse 
personnel to be randomly drug tested.59 
 
 Furthermore, MLB “established the Department of Investigations to 
deal with the investigation of drug use.”60 The department reported directly 
to both the Commissioner and the President of MLB61 and established a 
“hotline for the anonymous reporting of information concerning the use of 
 
 
56 Id. at SR-30. Expert and former athlete Dr. Jay Hoffman proposed educating players about 
appropriate training and nutritional methods in order to counter skepticism that “discussions of health 
risks alone, although important, generally will not deter a player from using [PEDs] because players 
who consider using [PEDs] do not view them as dangerous if used properly.” Id. See also Selig, supra 
note 18, at 94 (stating that in 2003, Commissioner Selig hired Dr. Gary Green, former director of 
UCLA’s intercollegiate drug testing program and chairman of the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association’s subcommittee on Drug Testing and Drug Education, to create and incorporate educational 
programs concerning PEDs in an attempt to make such programs more effective in reaching players). 
57 The Mitchell Report, supra note 9, at SR-31 to -32. Such “state-of-the-art” program would 
include administration by “a truly independent authority that holds exclusive authority over its structure 
and administration,” transparency to the public “by allowing for periodic audits of [the program’s] 
operations and providing regular reports of aggregate data on testing and test results…[in addition to] 
adequate year-round, unannounced testing…[and employment of] best practices as they develop.”  
58 Id. at SR-30 to -31. According to Mitchell, the most important lesson that he learned from this 
investigation was that MLB needed to not only develop a “well-conceived, well-executed, and 
cooperative effort by everyone involved in [MLB]” to address the serious issue of PEDs, but also to 
“[let] go of the past and [look] to the future.” Id. at SR-34. See also Selig, supra note 18, at 73 (quoting 
Mitchell that “everyone involved should be trying to bring this troubling chapter in [MLB’s] history to 
a close. The more time you spend in the past, the harder it is to look into the future.”).  
59 See Selig, supra note 18, at 93. 
60 Id. At the time, former New York Police Department deputy chief Dan Mullin, along with the 
help of former FBI agent George Hanna, headed the Department of Investigations.  
61 The President of MLB at the time was Bob DuPuy. See id. at 152.  
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prohibited substances.”62 Additionally, MLB developed a program that 
“require[d] top prospects to the [MLB] draft to submit to drug testing before 
the draft.”63 In accordance with Mitchell’s recommendations, MLB also 
announced that it would coordinate with “the Partnership for a Drug-Free 
America and the Taylor Hooton Foundation to educate America’s youth and 
their parents about the dangers of [PEDs]”64 in order to demonstrate that 
“the use of [PEDs] is illegal, it is cheating, it does long-term damage to an 
athlete’s health, and it puts at risk an athlete’s reputation and integrity.”65 
Next, MLB and the NFL funded an effort led by “Dr. Don Catlin, one of the 
leading drug testing experts in the world, to develop a urine test [that could 
detect] hGH.”66 Finally, MLB “joined with the United States Olympic 
Committee in a new, long-term program of research on [PEDs]” with an 
initial commitment of “$3 million in funding.”67  
 In April 2008, MLB and the MLBPA appointed an Independent 
Program Administrator (“IPA”), who would “be appointed for a multiyear 
term, be removed only in narrow circumstances, and issue annual public 
reports.”68 The new drug program added “600 tests per year (making the 
total number of tests 3,600), [for] an average of three [tests] per player per 
year.”69 Additionally, the program “[expanded] the list of banned substances 
 
 
62 Id. at 94. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. This program would “warn our youth about the health risks in using steroids and other black 
market drugs, and teach them how to achieve the same improved results on the field through proper 
training, nutrition, and methods that are legal and safe.” Id. at 106-07. 
65 Id. at 107. 
66 Id. at 108-09. Commissioner Selig said that MLB would “support the utilization” of a “valid, 
commercially available and practicable test for hGH…regardless of whether the test is based on blood 
or urine.” Id. at 109. 
67 Id. Commissioner Selig stated that the use of PEDs is not only a problem for MLB, but also a 
“societal problem that extends beyond [MLB] or any sport.” Id. at 110. Selig also affirmed MLB’s 
support of various bills that had been introduced in Congress, such as HR 4911 and Senate Bill 877 that 
would “make hGH a Schedule III Controlled Substance,” Senate Bill 2470 that would “prohibit the sale 
of DHEA [dehydroepiandrosterone] to minors,” and Senate Bill 2237 that would “crackdown on the sale 
of controlled substances over the Internet.” Id. 
68 See USA TODAY, supra note 22. The IPA at the time was Dr. Bryan Smith, who was appointed 
to a three-year term and could only be removed for engaging in conduct that was inconsistent with 
MLB’s drug program or would otherwise affect his ability to serve as IPA. See Press Release, Donald 
Fehr and MLBPA, MLBPA, MLB Amend Joint Drug Agreement (May 2008) (on file with author). The 
IPA’s annual reports would summarize “the number of tests administered, the number of positive tests 
resulting in discipline, the substances involved in the positives, the number of Therapeutic Use 
Exemptions granted by category of ailment and the number of non-analytical positives.” Id. 
Furthermore, “records of negative test results [would] be maintained for two years” and the IPA was 
required “annually to audit test results and to review the performance of the collection company and the 
laboratory.” Id. 
69 Id. In addition, the IPA was “authorized to conduct up to 375 off-season tests over his three-year 
initial term, which [would], on average, more than double the amount of off-season testing.” Id. 
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to include insulin-like growth factor (IGF-1), gonadotropins, aromatase 
inhibitors, selective estrogen receptor modulators and antiestrogens, 
including clomid.”70 Moreover, the program required the IPA to “develop, 
in consultation with the Commissioner’s Office and the [MLBPA], an 
annual, mandatory educational program,”71 and players who were named in 
the Mitchell Report were required to “join MLB in participating in efforts 
designed to educate youth and their parents regarding the dangers of [PEDs] 
and regarding appropriate and safe training methods.”72 In 2009, MLB 
began to “impose uniform certification requirements on fulltime strength 
and conditioning coaches employed by each [c]lub,”73 and in 2010, the 
Commissioner issued “guidelines designed to ensure that qualified strength 
and conditioning coaches are available to players at all levels of each 
organization.”74 Finally, MLB “announced that its testing program would 
be expanded to cover the top 200 prospects in the Amateur Draft.”75 
 In November 2011, MLB and the MLBPA announced “an agreement 
to have blood testing for [hGH] during spring training in 2012.”76 In June 
2012, blood testing for hGH was expanded to also include the off-season 
and “for reasonable cause.”77 In January 2013, blood testing for hGH was 
further extended to include the regular season, and the “World Anti-Doping 
Agency Laboratory in Laval, Quebec, [began to] keep records of each 
player, including his baseline ratio of testosterone to epitestosterone.”78 
Finally, in March 2014, MLB and the MLBPA announced more severe 
penalties for first and second-time drug offenders: first-time offenders 
would be suspended eighty games, and second-time offenders would be 
 
 
70 Id. 
71 Id. The agreement called for input from MLB’s Strength and Conditioning Committee in order 
to “ensure that the educational efforts [emphasized] legitimate training methods for professional 
athletes.” Id.  
72 Id. The MLBPA was also required to “contribute $200,000 to an antidrug charitable, educational 
or research organization.” Id. In exchange for players’ participation in MLB’s educational efforts and 
the MLBPA’s donation, the Commissioner “determined that he [would] not exercise his authority under 
[MLB’s] Joint Drug Agreement against [p]layers and former [p]layers named in the Mitchell Report.” 
Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. If players tested positive, all thirty clubs were notified, “but players [would] remain draft 
eligible.” Id. If players did not comply with drug testing, they [would] not be eligible for selection [in 
the draft].” Id.  
76 See USA TODAY, supra note 22. 
77 Id. Additionally, the agreement called for increased random urine testing, and players “[who 
were] suspended before [MLB’s] All-Star game [became] ineligible for election and selection to the 
[All-Star] game.” Id. Moreover, rules regarding collection of specimens were modified after Ryan Braun 
successfully overturned his initial suspension through the grievance process, as further discussed below. 
See id. 
78 Id. The lab would “conduct Carbon Isotope Ratio Mass Spectrometry (IRMS) tests of any urine 
specimens that ‘[varied] materially.’” Id. 
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suspended for an entire season of 162 games without pay.79  
B. MLB’s Current Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment 
Program 
Section 2 of MLB’s current Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment 
Program (“the Program”) sets forth a list of prohibited substances and 
provides that “[a]ll [p]layers shall be prohibited from using, possessing, 
selling, facilitating the sale of, distributing, or facilitating the distribution of 
any Drug of Abuse, Performance Enhancing Substance, Stimulant, DHEA, 
Diuretic and/or Masking Agent (collectively referred to as “Prohibited 
Substances).”80 Section 2A defines “Drugs of Abuse” to include “[a]ny and 
all drugs or substances included on Schedules I and II of the Code of Federal 
Regulations’ Schedule of Controlled Substances.”81 Section 2B defines 
“Performance Enhancing Substances” to include “[a]ny and all anabolic 
androgenic steroids covered by Schedule III of the Code of Federal 
Regulations’ Schedule of Controlled Substances.”82 Finally, Sections 2C 
and 2D set forth the banned substances labeled “Stimulants” and “DHEA,” 
respectively.83 
Section 3 of the Program sets forth the testing procedures and protocols 
for the aforementioned banned substances.84 In addition to the unannounced 
urine specimen collections that are collected upon players’ reporting to 
spring training,85 the IPA is required to conduct 4,800 unannounced urine 
specimen collections for PEDs, stimulants, and DHEA during the regular 
 
 
79 See id. Players who served any PED suspension during the season were “ineligible for that year’s 
postseason.” Id. In certain instances involving positive drug tests, an arbitrator would “have the 
discretion to reduce discipline if the player prove[d] the use was not intended to enhance performance.” 
Id. Furthermore, urine tests conducting during the regular season increased from 1,400 to 3,200, and 
“400 random blood collections [were] used to detect [hGH] in addition to the mandatory one [hGH blood 
test] for each player [conducted] during spring training.” Id. Lastly, each player would have at least one 
IRMS test performed on his specimens, and didehydroepiandrosterone was added to the banned 
substances list. See id.  
80 See Major League Baseball’s Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, supra note 8, at 
8.  
81 Id. Such drugs include natural cannabinoids, synthetic THC and cannabimimetics, cocaine, LSD, 
opiates, ecstasy, GHB, and PCP. See id.  
82 Id. at 8-9. Section 2B sets forth a non-exhaustive list of seventy-six different banned PEDs. See 
id. at 9-11. 
83 Section 2C provides a list of fifty-six banned stimulants. See id. at 11-13. Section 2D states, 
“DHEA is a [p]rohibited [s]ubstance covered by the Program.” Id. at 13. 
84 Additionally, this section sets forth provisions for reasonable cause testing, follow-up testing, 
collection procedures and testing protocols, positive test results, notice to the parties involved, multiple 
disciplines for the same use, and therapeutic use exemptions. See id. at 15-25. 
85 See id. at 15. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
268 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 10:257 
 
 
season and 350 urine collections during the off-season.86 Furthermore, in 
addition to the unannounced blood specimen collections for hGH that are 
conducted during spring training, the IPA is also required to conduct 500 
blood specimen collections during the regular season and 400 collections 
during the off-season.87  
 Section 7A of the Program sets forth the disciplinary provisions for 
PED violations.88 First-time violations result in an eighty-game suspension, 
second-time violations result in a 162-game suspension with a pay 
suspension of 183 days, and third-time violations result in “[p]ermanent 
suspension from MLB.”89 Players who are permanently suspended “may 
apply, no earlier than one (1) year following the imposition of the 
suspension, to the Commissioner for discretionary reinstatement after a 
minimum period of two (2) years.”90 
 Section 8 of the Program sets forth the procedures for appeals, 
including arbitration proceedings and grievance procedures.91 Section 8A 
provides that an “[a]rbitration [p]anel shall have jurisdiction to review any 
determination that a [p]layer has violated the Program.”92 Section 8B states 
that the: 
Commissioner’s Office shall have the burden of establishing that a 
[p]layer’s test result was ‘positive’…and that the test result was 
obtained pursuant to a test authorized under the Program and was 
conducted in accordance with the [c]ollection [p]rocedures and 
[t]esting [p]rotocols of the Program and the protocols of the 
Montreal Laboratory…[but] is not required to otherwise establish 
intent, fault, negligence or knowing use of a [PED] on the 
[p]layer’s part.93  
 
 Players may challenge the “initial showing by the Commissioner’s 
Office that the result was ‘positive’ or that it was obtained pursuant to a test 
authorized under the Program and was conducted in accordance with the 
 
 
86 See id. at 16. See also Details of MLB, MLBPA Labor Agreement, infra note 242 and 
accompanying text. 
87 See Major League Baseball’s Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, supra note 8, at 
16-17. See also Details of MLB, MLBPA Labor Agreement, infra note 242 and accompanying text. 
88 See Major League Baseball’s Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, supra note 8, at 
37. 
89 Id. at 37-38. 
90 Id. at 38. The Commissioner has the authority to hear the player’s reinstatement application and 
issue a determination within thirty days of the conclusion of the hearing. The player may challenge the 
Commissioner’s determination under a grievance procedure before an arbitration panel. See id. 
91 See id. at 49-56. 
92 Id. at 49. 
93 Id. at 50. For blood test results involving hGH, “the Commissioner’s Office shall have the burden 
of establishing the presence of hGH in the [p]layer’s blood specimen…[including establishing] the 
accuracy and reliability of the blood test administered to the [p]layer.” Id. 
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[c]ollection [p]rocedures.”94 However, the Commissioner’s Office “will 
carry its burden (a) by demonstrating that there was no deviation; (b) by 
demonstrating that the deviation was authorized by the parties or by the IPA 
in an individual case…or (c) by demonstrating that the deviation did not 
affect the accuracy or reliability of the test result.”95 Therefore, once the 
Commissioner’s Office meets its burden that the player’s sample tested 
positive for a banned substance in accordance with proper drug testing 
procedures, there is a presumption that the substance was present due to the 
player’s fault or negligence. The burden then shifts to the player to prove 
the affirmative defense that the presence of the banned substance in his 
positive test result “was not due to his fault or negligence.”96 
 Finally, Section 9 sets forth the educational programs and materials to 
be developed by the IPA, in consultation with the Commissioner and the 
MLBPA.97 Section 9(3) provides that the Joint Education Committee “will 
include [educational] components on proper nutrition, training and 
performance.”98 In addition, Section 9(2) requires the production of 
“educational materials…[to] be made available to all Major League [c]lubs 
and [p]layers…throughout each season.”99 Furthermore, the educational 
program will create a “joint website and other technological resources 
containing information pertinent to the Program in consultation with a 
jointly-selected expert (or experts).”100 
 
II.  NUMEROUS MLB PLAYERS HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF USING PEDS 
 
A. Barry Bonds 
 
In 2008, Barry Bonds, former San Francisco Giants player and MLB’s 
all-time career homerun leader, was indicted in the Northern District Court 
of California for allegedly using PEDs.101 Greg Anderson, a personal trainer 
whose clientele included professional athletes like Bonds, was alleged to 
 
 
94 Id. at 51. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. However, the player “cannot satisfy his burden by merely denying that he intentionally used 
a [PED]; [rather, he] must provide objective evidence in support of his denial. Among other things, such 
objective evidence may question the accuracy or reliability of the ‘positive’ test result.” Id. If the player 
successfully “proves by clear and convincing evidence that he bears no significant fault or negligence 
for the presence of the [PED] in his test result, the [a]rbitration [p]anel may reduce the mandated 
suspension.” Id. 
97 See id. at 56. 
98 Id. at 57. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 56. 
101 Superseding Indictment, United States v. Bonds, No. CR 07-0732-S (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2008). 
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have illegally obtained and distributed PEDs to his clients, including 
Bonds.102 Anderson was also affiliated with a laboratory located in 
Burlingame, California, known as BALCO, which conducted tests of 
Anderson’s clients’ specimens, including blood tests.103 Evidence was later 
obtained that included “positive tests for the presence of anabolic steroids 
and other [PEDs] for Bonds and other professional athletes.”104 Bonds 
testified before a grand jury under oath that he had never received or taken 
any steroids from Anderson.105 Bonds was subsequently indicted with 
fourteen counts of False Declarations Before a Grand Jury in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1623(a), as well as one count of Obstruction of Justice in 
violation of 18 § U.S.C. 1503.106  
 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed in greater detail Bonds’ 
connection with Anderson and BALCO. Anderson, a long-time friend of 
Bonds, provided Bonds with “substances including ‘vitamins and protein 
shakes,’ ‘flax seed oil,’ and a ‘cream,’” some of which allegedly contained 
steroids.107 Bonds provided Anderson with five or six blood samples and 
approximately four urine samples, which were allegedly used to determine 
whether Bonds was deficient in certain nutrients.108 Although Anderson 
informed Bonds that he tested negative for steroids,109 BALCO “recorded 
[on its log sheets], under the name ‘Barry Bonds,’ positive results of urine 
and blood tests for [PEDs].”110 Anderson later pled guilty to illegally 
distributing PEDs to professional athletes and remained imprisoned for 
 
 
102 Id. at 1:27-2:4. The Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation Division investigated 
Anderson “concerning [BALCO’s] distribution of anabolic steroids and other illegal [PEDs] and the 
related money laundering of proceeds from the drug distributions.” Id. at 2:5-11. 
103 Id. at 1:25-2:4. BALCO stands for Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative. 
104 Id. at 3:2-4. 
105 See id. at 3:20, 4:15, 5:9, 6:27, 7:13, 8:8-23, 9:24, 10:15, 11:10, 12:6-24, and 13:12-13.  
106 See id. at 3-14. Anderson refused to testify at the grand jury proceeding and was subsequently 
imprisoned after being held in contempt of court. See United States v. Bonds, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16120 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2009), at n.2. Consequently, the Northern District Court of California held 
that certain documents and biological specimens, as well as Anderson’s statements that constituted 
hearsay, either were or may be inadmissible. See id. at *9, *11, *13, *17, *20, *23, *25-27, *33. 
107 United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2010). Bonds admitted to paying Anderson 
$15,000 per year for weight training and at one point provided Anderson with a “gift” of $20,000. See 
id. at 499. Bonds testified that “he took whatever supplements and creams Anderson gave him without 
question because he trusted Anderson as his friend” and that “he did not believe anything Anderson 
provided him contained steroids.” Id. 
108 See id. Anderson took the samples to BALCO’s then-Director of Operations, James Valente, 
who assigned Bonds’ samples with code numbers, which were logged in a book, and then sent the urine 
samples to Quest Diagnostics and the blood samples to LabOne & Specialty Lab for analysis. See id. at 
498. However, Bonds’ urine and blood test results were labeled under the name “Barry Bonds.” See id. 
at 497. 
109 See id. at 499. Anderson told Bonds, “You’re - you’re negative,” and Bonds trusted Anderson’s 
statement. See id. 
110 Id. at 497. The government subsequently seized these records. See id. at 498. 
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contempt of court for failing to testify against Bonds.111  
The government attempted to “introduce Valente’s testimony that 
Anderson told him for each sample that ‘[t]his blood/urine comes from 
Barry Bonds’” in order to demonstrate a link between the positive test 
results and Bonds.112 Bonds “filed a motion in limine to exclude numerous 
pieces of evidence…[including]…the laboratory blood and urine test 
results, and the BALCO log sheets of test results.”113 Bonds argued that 
“Anderson’s statements were inadmissible hearsay and that the lab results 
could not be authenticated as Bonds’ in that manner.”114  
The Ninth Circuit first affirmed the district court’s finding that 
Anderson’s statements failed to meet FRE Rule 807’s requirement of 
“[having] trustworthiness.”115 The Court then affirmed the district court’s 
finding that Bonds failed to expressly or impliedly authorize Anderson to 
identify the samples as his and thus rejected the government’s argument that 
Anderson’s statements were authorized pursuant to FRE Rule 
801(d)(2)(C).116 Next, the Court affirmed the district court’s finding that 
“Anderson was an independent contractor, rather than an employee”117 and 
thus rejected the government’s argument that Anderson’s statements were 
permitted as “statements by an agent” pursuant to FRE Rule 801(d)(2)(d). 
Finally, the Court affirmed the district court’s finding that BALCO’s log 
sheets constituted inadmissible hearsay.118 
 
B. José Canseco 
 
 
 
111 See id. at 499. 
112 Id. at 500. On appeal, the government argued that Anderson’s statements were admissible 
pursuant to the residual exception of Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) Rule 807, the exceptions for 
authorized statements pursuant to FRE Rule 801(d)(2)(C), or “for statements by an agent” pursuant to 
FRE Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Id. 
113 Id. at 499-500. 
114 Id. at 500. 
115 See id. at 502. The district court found that “Anderson’s statements were untrustworthy, in 
major part because Valente admitted that he once mislabeled a sample when Anderson asked him to do 
so.” Id. 
116 See id. at 503-04. The Court reasoned that there was “no evidence of discussions [between 
Bonds and Anderson] about how Anderson was to deal with [Bonds’] samples.” Id. at 503.  
117 Id. at 504. The Court reasoned that there was “no evidence that Bonds directed or controlled 
any of Anderson’s activities.” Id. at 505. Rather, the evidence suggested a “lack of control exercised by 
Bonds” in his relationship with Anderson. Id. Moreover, the Court reasoned that a principal-agent 
relationship did not exist between Bonds and Anderson, because “Anderson did not generally act subject 
to Bonds’ control in his capacity as a some-time trainer, nor did he or Bonds manifest assent that Bonds 
had the right to control Anderson’s actions as a trainer.” Id. at 506.  
118 See id. at 508. The Court reasoned that the government “[could not] link the samples to [Bonds] 
without Anderson’s testimony.” Id. Accordingly, the log sheets went “no further toward showing the 
actual sample came from [Bonds] than Valente’s testimony about what Anderson told him.” Id. 
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 Initial reports regarding the use of steroids in MLB involved former 
Oakland Athletics player, José Canseco.119 Canseco was “the subject of the 
first media speculation about his use of steroids, and Boston Red Sox fans 
taunted him for his alleged steroids use during the 1988 American League 
Championship Series.”120  
In his autobiography Juiced: Wild Times, Rampant ‘Roids, Smash Hits, 
and How Baseball Got Big, Canseco “admitted experimenting with steroids 
and other drugs to build muscle and improve his power…[and] claimed to 
know a number of major leaguers who had used steroids and other PEDs to 
enhance their game.”121 One month after the book’s publication in February 
2005, Canseco and several other players mentioned in his book were invited 
to testify before the House of Representatives’ Committee on Government 
Reform during hearings regarding the use of steroids in MLB.122 Although 
Canseco mentioned in his opening statement that his attorney advised him 
not comment on his alleged use of steroids, Canseco “went on to answer 
every question directed at him, noting beforehand that being denied 
immunity would compromise his answers.”123 Contrary to other players’ 
testimony, Canseco reported that he witnessed widespread use of steroids in 
MLB and “claimed that [MLB] had turned its back on steroids problems 
because the resulting power increase helped the sport recover from the work 
stoppage that cut off the 1994 season.”124 
 In addition to his own use of steroids and hGH, Canseco claimed that 
he personally injected five other players with steroids and hGH and 
educated such players on how to use steroids.125 Canseco stated that he 
“[a]bsolutely” injected some of his former teammates, such as Mark 
McGwire, Rafael Palmeiro, Ivan Rodriguez, Juan Gonzalez, and Jason 
Giambi, often times in a bathroom stall prior to a game or batting practice.126 
Canseco said steroid use and hGH injections at the time were “so common” 
 
 
119 The Mitchell Report, supra note 9, at SR-14. 
120 Id. 
121 See ESPN, supra note 7. 
122 See id. MLB informed the Committee that Commissioner Selig, as well as six of seven players 
invited to testify, would not appear. Consequently, the Committee “issued subpoenas to [eleven] 
individuals, including Selig, Mark McGwire, José Canseco, Sammy Sosa, Curt Schilling, Frank Thomas, 
Rafael Palmeiro, and [then-MLBPA] chief Donald Fehr.” Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Jose Canseco: ‘Juiced,’ CBS NEWS (Aug. 5, 2005), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/jose-
canseco-juiced/2/.  
126 Id. In response to Canseco’s comments, McGwire released the following statement: “Once and 
for all, I did not use steroids nor any illegal substance. The relationship that these allegations portray 
couldn’t be further from the truth.” Id. Additionally, Palmeiro’s lawyer stated the following: “Mr. 
Palmeiro categorically denies that he has ever engaged in illicit use of steroids or any substance banned 
by [MLB].” Id. Giambi, who admitted to a federal grand jury that he had used steroids since at least 
2001, replied: “I think [what Canseco said is] sad. I think it’s delusional.” Id. 
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and represented “common ground” among players.127  
 
C. Alex Rodriguez 
 
 In February 2009, following the release of a Sports Illustrated article 
naming him as one of 104 players who tested positive for PEDs in 2003, 
former New York Yankees third baseman Alex Rodriguez “admitted he 
used steroids from 2001 to 2003 while playing for the Texas Rangers.”128 
Rodriguez said he turned to PEDs because he felt “an enormous amount of 
pressure to perform after signing a huge contract with [the Texas 
Rangers],”129 but acknowledged that his decision was “naïve” and “stupid” 
at a time “when ‘baseball was a different culture.’”130  
In 2013, the Miami New Times published documents that identified 
several MLB players, including Rodriguez, who were alleged to have 
obtained hGH and other PEDs from an anti-aging clinic located in Coral 
Gables, Florida, known as Biogenesis.131 On August 5, 2013, MLB 
suspended Rodriguez for 211 games, which was “four times the length of 
the other thirteen players suspended in connection with the Biogenesis 
investigation, and the longest non-lifetime ban in baseball history.”132 One 
day after his suspension was imposed, Rodriguez “filed a grievance under 
the [MLB collective bargaining agreement], indicating his intent to appeal 
MLB’s suspension.”133 Rodriguez subsequently lost potential sponsorship 
contracts from companies like Nike and Toyota134 and faced a loss of up to 
$30 million in “certain performance-based milestones in his contract with 
the Yankees.”135 As a result, Rodriguez sued MLB and Commissioner Selig 
for one count of Tortious Interference with Prospective Business 
Relationships and one count of Tortious Interference with Existing 
 
 
127 Id. 
128 See ESPN, supra note 7. 
129 Id. Rodriguez signed a ten-year contract worth $252 million with the Texas Rangers on 
December 11, 2000. See Fifteen Things to Know on 15th Anniversary of Rangers’ $252 Million 
Megadeal with A-Rod, ESPN (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/14330504/alex-
rodriguez-252-million-contract-texas-rangers-remains-landmark-15th-anniversary.  
130 See ESPN, supra note 7. 
131 Complaint at 10, Rodriguez v. Major League Baseball, No. 2013-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). A 
disgruntled former employee of Biogenesis, Porter Fischer, provided the documents, claimed that he 
was owed back pay, and sought to embarrass Biogenesis’ owner, Anthony Bosch. See id. Milwaukee 
Brewers’ outfielder Ryan Braun was also identified in the Biogenesis documents, as discussed below. 
See id. at 11. 
132 Id. at 25. Rodriguez’s suspension exceeded the then-fifty-game suspension for first-time 
violations by 161 games. See id.  
133 Id. 
134 See id. at 26. 
135 Id. at 27. Rodriguez’s contract with the Yankees was set to expire in 2017. See id. at 29. 
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Contracts.136 
 
D. Mark McGwire 
In August 1998, when coverage of steroid use in MLB “reached 
what seemed at the time to be a peak,” former St. Louis Cardinals player 
Mark McGwire was found to be “using the [then-legal] steroid precursor 
androstenedione while chasing the single-season home run record.”137 At 
the time, androstenedione was “banned by the [NFL] and the NCAA” but 
was not a banned substance in MLB, “which had yet to institute a testing 
program for many substances.”138 During a 2005 hearing before the House 
of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, McGwire stated 
that “he could not answer any questions about his past, including those 
related to his alleged involvement with PEDs.”139 On January 11, 2010, 
McGwire released a statement to the Associated Press that he used steroids 
and hGH “on and off for nearly a decade.”140 During his first four years on 
the Hall of Fame voting ballot, McGwire “failed to earn even [twenty-five 
percent] of the vote…and his support fell below [twenty percent] in the 2011 
[Hall of Fame] voting, [which was] the first [such voting] held after his 
admission [to using PEDs].”141  
 
E. Ryan Braun 
 Ryan Braun, a current player for the Milwaukee Brewers, successfully 
“avoided suspension under [the Program] by demonstrating that MLB had 
failed to maintain the proper chain-of-custody for [his] urine samples.”142 In 
October 2011, Braun tested positive for elevated testosterone and was 
initially suspended fifty games.143 However, in February 2012, Braun’s 
 
 
136 See id. at 28-29. However, Rodriguez later dropped all lawsuits and accepted his suspension. 
137 The Mitchell Report, supra note 9, at SR-14. The androstenedione was discovered in McGwire’s 
locker. See Selig, supra note 18, at 101. During the 1998 season, McGwire broke Roger Maris’ 1961 
single-season homerun record of sixty-one homeruns after he hit seventy homeruns. McGwire edged 
former Chicago Cubs player Sammy Sosa by five homeruns. See ESPN, supra note 7. The homerun race 
between McGwire and Sosa, who were both named the Sports Illustrated “Sportsman of the Year” in 
1998, “captured the attention of the country and helped to reclaim popularity for [MLB] four years after 
a strike had shortened the 1994 season.” Id.  
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Mark McGwire Admits Using Steroids, CBS NEWS (Jan. 11, 2010, 3:06 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mark-mcgwire-admits-using-steroids/. McGwire stated that he “wished 
[he] had never played during the [S]teroid [E]ra” and that he used PEDs for “health purposes” and not 
“for any type of strength use.” Id.  
141 ESPN, supra note 7. 
142 Complaint at 11, Rodriguez v. Major League Baseball, No. 2013-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
143 Ryan Braun Apologizes for PED Use, ESPN (Aug. 23, 2013), 
http://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/9592788/ryan-braun-milwaukee-brewers-apologizes-ped-use. 
Dino Laurenzi Jr. was the individual who collected Braun’s urine sample following the Brewers’ 
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fifty-game suspension was “overturned when an arbitrator ruled that 
[Braun’s] urine sample was mishandled.”144 One day after his suspension 
was overturned, Braun held a news conference at the Brewers’ spring 
training stadium in Phoenix, Arizona, where he “proclaimed [that] he had 
been vindicated.”145 Braun further stated: 
If I had done this intentionally or unintentionally, I’d be the first 
one to step up and say, ‘I did it.’ By no means am I perfect, but if 
I’ve ever made any mistakes in my life I’ve taken responsibility for 
my actions. I truly believe in my heart, and I would bet my life, that 
this substance never entered my body at any point…I will continue 
to take the high road because that’s who I am, and that’s the way 
that I’ve lived my life. We won because the truth is on my side. The 
truth is always relevant, and at the end of the day the truth 
prevailed…Ultimately, as I sit here today, the system worked 
because I am innocent, and I was able to prove my innocence.146 
 
 However, after being identified as one of the players who allegedly 
received hGH and other PEDs from the Biogenesis clinic in Florida,147 
Braun received a sixty-five game suspension from MLB on July 22, 2013.148 
In August 2013, upon accepting his suspension, Braun “admitted taking 
[PEDs] during his [National League Most Valuable Player] season of 2011” 
and said that he “took a cream and lozenge containing banned substances 
while rehabilitating an injury.”149  
 
F. Roger Clemens 
 
 Roger Clemens, a former player for the New York Yankees, was 
identified in the Mitchell Report and alleged to have “used anabolic steroids 
on multiple occasions in 1998, 2000, and 2001, and [hGH] on multiple 
 
 
National League Division Series game versus the Arizona Diamondbacks on October 1, 2011. Id. 
144 Id. Laurenzi “stored the samples from Braun and two other players at home and dropped [the 
samples] off at a FedEx office on Monday [October 3, 2011], rather than send [the samples] immediately, 
as specified in [MLB’s] drug collection rules.” Id. The MLBPA argued that “[Braun’s] specimen was 
handled improperly, and arbitrator Shyam Das overturned [Braun’s fifty-game suspension] on [February 
23, 2012].” Id. 
145 Id. Following Braun’s news conference, his lawyer “criticized Laurenzi when [Laurenzi] 
defended himself.” Id.  
146 Transcript of Ryan Braun’s Statement, MILWAUKEE WISCONSIN JOURNAL SENTINEL (Feb. 24, 
2012), http://archive.jsonline.com/blogs/sports/140333483.html.  
147 See Complaint at 11, Rodriguez v. Major League Baseball, No. 2013-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
148 Ryan Braun Apologizes for PED Use, supra note 143. Braun was suspended “[fifty] games for 
the drug infraction and [fifteen] games for his conduct at the time of the grievance.” Id. 
149 Id. 
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occasions in 2000.”150 Following the release of the Mitchell Report, 
Clemens explicitly denied using PEDs and “stated publicly that he would 
appear before the [House Committee on Government Reform] to answer 
any questions.”151 During a deposition conducted on February 5, 2008, 
Clemens testified under oath that he had “not used steroids or [hGH]…[and] 
had never possessed or seen anabolic steroids or [hGH], and that he had 
never discussed anabolic steroids or [hGH] with anyone.”152 During the 
hearing before the House Committee on Government Reform on February 
13, 2008, Clemens further testified under oath that he had “never taken 
steroids or [hGH],” and that his former strength coach, Brian McNamee, 
had “never given [him] [hGH]…or steroids of any kind.”153  
 Clemens was subsequently charged with one count of Obstruction of 
Congress in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1515(b)154 for knowingly 
making false and misleading statements during his testimony before the 
House Committee on Government Reform. Furthermore, Clemens was 
charged with three counts of False Statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1001(a)(2), (c)(2) for “knowingly and willfully [making] a materially false, 
fictitious, and fraudulent statement and representation” regarding his use of 
anabolic steroids and hGH injections and his false accusations of McNamee 
injecting him with Vitamin B12.155 Finally, Clemens was charged with two 
counts of Perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1) for willfully and 
knowingly providing false testimony under oath regarding his use of hGH 
and anabolic steroids.156 
 
G. Manny Ramirez 
 In May 2009, Manny Ramirez, a former player for the Boston Red Sox, 
was suspended for fifty games for violating MLB’s drug policy.157 Ramirez 
was suspended “for using human chorionic gonadotropin [“hCG”] after 
 
 
150 Indictment at 8, United States v. Clemens, 793 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. CR-10-
223). The Mitchell Report’s investigation with respect to Clemens was based on “statements [made] by 
Clemens’ former trainer, Brian McNamee, who claimed that he had previously injected Clemens…more 
than a dozen times with steroids and [hGH] between 1998 and 2001, while Clemens said the injections 
were painkillers.” See also ESPN, supra note 7. 
151 Indictment at 9, Clemens, 793 F. Supp. 2d 236 (No. CR-10-223).  
152 Id. at 11. 
153 Id. at 11-12.  
154 Id. at 7-14. 
155 Id. at 14-17. 
156 Id. at 17-19. While Clemens pleaded not guilty to all six charges in his trial that began in July 
2011, “a mistrial was declared just days into the trial, after prosecutors showed video that was previously 
ruled to be inadmissible.” See also ESPN, supra note 7. Clemens was “found not guilty on all six counts” 
when he was re-tried in 2012. Id.  
157 Id. Ramirez’s fifty-game suspension cost him $7.7 million of his $25 million salary for the 2009 
season. See id. 
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high levels of testosterone were detected during a spring training drug 
test.”158 In a statement from the MLBPA, Ramirez said he was using hCG 
as a “medication for a personal health issue,” and his agent, Scott Boras, 
added that the hCG was “prescribed by a doctor for a medical condition.”159 
During spring training of the 2011 season while playing for the Tampa Bay 
Rays, Ramirez again tested positive for yet another PED, and MLB 
informed him that he would face a one hundred-game suspension.160 
Ramirez, who did not want to serve the one hundred-game suspension, 
instead opted to retire.161 
 
III. STATISTICS INDICATE A DANGEROUS RATE OF ADOLESCENT PED 
USAGE 
 
 Various studies have been conducted regarding the use of PEDs among 
adolescents in the United States. For example, Digital Citizens Alliance 
commissioned a Zogby Analytics poll to conduct surveys about the use of 
steroids among teenagers.162 The 2013 study concluded that PED usage 
among teenagers was high, as “[t]hirty-six percent of males aged 18-25 said 
that they, or someone they know, had taken [PEDs] like steroids or [hGH]. 
In all, over [eight] percent admitted that they themselves had taken 
[PEDs].”163 Furthermore, six percent of parents surveyed “said that they 
knew their son had taken steroids and an additional [ten] percent said they 
knew someone else who had, [and] [o]ne in [five] parents were worried that 
 
 
158 Id. Athletes typically used hCG—a fertility drug that MLB banned in 2008—between cycles of 
steroids. See id. 
159 Id. Upon Ramirez’s return to the Dodgers in July 2009, the New York Times published an article 
that reported Ramirez was “among the major leaguers who tested positive during [MLB’s] 2003 survey 
testing period.” Id. 
160 Rays’ Manny Ramirez to Retire, ESPN (Apr. 10, 2011), 
http://www.espn.com/mlb/news/story?id=6310125. MLB had informed Ramirez of “an issue” under the 
MLB drug program. See id. 
161 See id. Had he accepted the one-hundred game suspension, Ramirez “would have become the 
first player [at the time] to be suspended twice for a [PED] violation since [MLB’s drug program] went 
into effect in 2005.” Id. In 2012, Ramirez returned to MLB and played for the Oakland Athletics after 
serving a reduced fifty-game suspension; however, he was later released after he failed to be called up 
from the minor leagues. See also ESPN, supra note 7. 
162 Zogby Poll: Teens and Steroids, DIGITAL CITIZENS ALLIANCE (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://www.digitalcitizensalliance.org/blog/cybersafe-world/zogby-poll-teens-and-steroids/. The study 
involved two separate surveys of 352 adults in the United States with male children between the ages of 
fourteen and twenty-five, as well as 350 males in the United States between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-five. Id.  
163 Better at Any Cost: The Dangerous Intersection of Young People, Steroids, and the Internet, 
DIGITAL CITIZENS ALLIANCE REPORT IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE TAYLOR HOOTON FOUNDATION 6, 
http://media.digitalcitizensactionalliance.org/314A5A5A9ABBBBC5E3BD824CF47C46EF4B9D3A7
6/a46c7adf-339a-4403-bae2-a03777700b91.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2016). 
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their child may take [PEDs] in the future.”164 Additionally, the study found 
that teenagers understood the risk of using PEDs, as “[t]hirty-six percent of 
males aged 18-25 said that taking [PEDs] without a doctor’s supervision 
was ‘potentially life threatening’…[fifty-five] percent said it was 
‘potentially harmful to overall health’…[and] [l]ess than [seven] percent 
thought that [PED] usage was ‘not very dangerous’ or ‘not dangerous at 
all.’”165  
 In addition, the Zogby Analytics poll concluded that professional 
athletes’ use of PEDs sends a “dangerous message to young athletes.”166 For 
example, “[o]ne in five males ages 18-25 said that taking [PEDs] is ‘the 
only way to make it in professional sports’…[and] [a]n additional [twenty-
four] percent said it was ‘critical to enhancing one’s athletic 
performance.’”167 Moreover, a “whopping [seventy-seven] percent of males 
surveyed said that [PED] usage in professional sports ‘puts pressure on 
young athletes to use drugs to get ahead’…[and] [p]arents felt exactly the 
same [way].”168 
 Additionally, the Partnership for Drug-Free Kids conducted a 2013 
Partnership Attitude Tracking Study that measured “substance abuse 
attitudes and behaviors” among parents and students.169 The study found 
that the prevalence rate of steroid use among teenagers rose from five 
percent in 2009 to seven percent in 2013, whereas the prevalence rate of 
hGH use among teenagers more than doubled from five percent in 2009 to 
eleven percent in 2013.170 Furthermore, the study found that teenagers’ 
perceived risk of the use of non-prescribed hGH and non-prescribed steroids 
decreased significantly.171 In addition, the study found that twenty-eight 
percent of teenagers surveyed in 2009 agreed with the statement “knowing 
that some successful athletes use [PEDs] makes me more likely to use or 
consider using them,” whereas this figure decreased to seventeen percent in 
 
 
164 Id. at 6. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. These findings were consistent with a recent University of Minnesota study, which found 
that 5.9% of boys and 4.6% of girls in middle school and high school admitted to using steroids. See id. 
at 6-7.  
169 The Partnership Attitude Tracking Study, PARTNERSHIP FOR DRUG-FREE KIDS 6 (2013), 
http://www.drugfree.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/PATS-2013-FULL-REPORT.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2016). The study consisted of two samples: 750 parents with at least one child between the 
ages of ten and nineteen, and 3,705 teenage students in grades nine through twelve. See id. 
170 See id. at 21. 
171 See id. at 22. In 2012, eighty-six percent of surveyed teenagers perceived that there was “great 
or moderate risk” in using non-prescribed hGH, and this figure decreased to eighty-one percent in 2013. 
See id. In 2009, eighty-five percent of surveyed teenagers perceived that there was “great or moderate 
risk” in using non-prescribed steroids, and this figure decreased to eighty-two percent in 2013. See id. 
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2013.172 Furthermore, seventeen percent of teenagers surveyed in 2009 
agreed that using PEDs in athletics was okay “if it’s the only way to win,” 
whereas this figure decreased to eight percent in 2013.173 
 The study concluded that there were “noteworthy trends in the 
perceived accessibility of steroids and peer use.”174 For example, twenty-
five percent of teenagers surveyed in 2009 reported that they had friends 
who used steroids, whereas this figure decreased to twenty-one percent in 
2013.175 Next, twenty-six percent of teenagers surveyed in 2009 reported 
that steroids were “very/fairly easy to get,” whereas this figure decreased to 
twenty-one percent in 2013.176 Finally, although the study found that “only 
[three] percent of parents believe[d] their teen ha[d] ever used steroids or 
other [PEDs],” the study also highlighted “a disconnect between parents and 
teens” regarding whether parents had actually discussed the use of steroids 
or other PEDs with their teenage children.177 
 
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT CONDEMN THE USE 
OF PEDS 
 
 Before presenting the proposed amendments to MLB’s approach to 
punishing PED usage, it is useful to articulate two distinct philosophical 
approaches to punishment, in order to demonstrate why such amendments 
are more consistent with moral intuitions than the status quo. These two 
theories of punishment are the retributive theory and consequentialist 
theory. 
 
 A. Retributive Theory and Kantianism 
 
 According to the retributive theory of punishment, criminal offenders 
deserve punishment because their behavior “upsets the peaceful balance of 
society, and punishment helps to restore the balance.”178 Under the 
 
 
172 Id. at 23. However, eighty-eight percent of teenagers surveyed in 2013 believed that using 
steroids for athletic performance or physical appearance could lead to a risk of severe health problems. 
See id. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 24. 
175 See id. 
176 See id. Thirty-seven percent of teenagers surveyed in 2009 believed that steroids were difficult 
to obtain, whereas this figure increased to forty-three percent in 2013. See id. at 26. 
177 Id. at 24. While fifty-eight percent of parents reported that they discussed the use of steroids or 
other PEDs with their teens, “only [twelve] percent of teens indicate[d] that the last conversation they 
had with their parents about the risks of drug use included talking about [hGH].” Id. 
178 Punishment – Theories of Punishment, JRANK, http://law.jrank.org/pages/9576/Punishment-
THEORIES-PUNISHMENT.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2016). The retributive theory of punishment is 
also commonly referred to as a “deontological” theory of punishment. See also STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, infra note 181. 
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retributive theory, the transgression itself serves as the basis for imposing 
punishment.179 Retributivist philosophers believe that human beings possess 
free will and have the ability to make rational decisions; however, those 
individuals who make a “conscious choice to upset the balance of society 
should be punished.”180 The retributive theory of punishment is considered 
to be “deontological” in nature if backward-looking, or ex post, 
considerations prevail over forward-looking, or ex ante, considerations, 
where “punishment is seen either as a good in itself or as a practice required 
by justice.”181 
 There are several moral bases and justifications for punishment under 
the retributive theory. First, punishment is justified under the principle of 
vengeance, as “wrongdoers should be forced to suffer because they have 
forced others to suffer.”182 In other words, “wrongdoers are thought to 
deserve to suffer, so punishment is justified on the grounds that it gives to 
wrongdoers what they deserve.”183 Equating punishment with the gravity of 
the offense is “embedded in the Judeo-Christian tradition in the Mosaic laws 
of the Old Testament that emphasize the idea of ‘an eye for an eye,’” or lex 
talionis.184 According to the retributive principle of “let the punishment fit 
the crime…punishment should fit primarily the moral gravity of the crime 
and, to a lesser extent, the characteristics of the offender,” as there are some 
offenders who “may be less blameworthy or culpable due to factors outside 
of their control,” such as diminished capacity, mental disease, or 
immaturity.185 Examples of retributive principles of punishment currently 
used in the United States justice system include mandatory sentencing 
policies and sentencing guidelines, where “punishment under these 
sentencing systems focuses primarily on the seriousness and characteristics 
of the criminal act rather than the offender.”186 Therefore, punishment is the 
primary objective under the retributive theory, while deterrence is a 
secondary objective.  
 Philosopher Immanuel Kant advocated for a theory of punishment that 
embraces a retributivist approach. Kant expressed his beliefs regarding the 
theory of punishment, commonly known as “Kantianism,” in his eighteenth-
 
 
179 See id. 
180 Id. 
181 Punishment, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (June 13, 2003), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/punishment/#ThePun (revised July 31, 2015).  
182 See JRANK, supra note 178. 
183 Kevin Murtagh, Punishment, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/punishme/#H2 (last visited Dec. 18, 2016).  
184 Philosophies of Punishment, WORDPRESS 15-16, 
https://marisluste.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/soda-filozofijas-3.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2016). 
185 Id. at 16. 
186 Id. 
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century writing, Science of Right.187 In his discussion of punishment, Kant 
refers to what he calls the “principle of equality,” where an individual who 
commits a wrongful act has not only inflicted suffering upon another, but 
also has “upset the balance of the scale of justice…and therefore rendered 
himself deserving of suffering.”188 Additionally, Kant refers to the 
“principle of retaliation,” where an individual’s wrongful act is to be 
“regarded as perpetrated on himself.”189 Therefore, according to Kant, “the 
justification of punishment is derived from the principle of retaliation, 
which is grounded in the principle of equality.”190 Kant discusses these 
principles in his Science of Right:  
But what is the mode and measure of punishment which public 
justice takes as its principle and standard? It is just the principle of 
equality, by which the pointer of the scale of justice is made to 
incline no more to the one side than the other. It may be rendered 
by saying that the undeserved evil which any one commits on 
another is to be regarded as perpetrated on himself. Hence it may 
be said: "If you slander another, you slander yourself; if you steal 
from another, you steal from yourself; if you strike another, you 
strike yourself; if you kill another, you kill yourself." This is the 
right of retaliation (jus talionis); and, properly understood, it is the 
only principle which in regulating a public court, as distinguished 
from mere private judgment, can definitely assign both the quality 
and the quantity of a just penalty.191 
 
 A second moral basis for punishment under the retributive theory is “to 
protect the legitimate rights of both society and the offender.”192 For 
example, “[s]ociety shows its respect for the free will of the wrongdoer 
through punishment…[and] [p]unishment shows respect for the wrongdoer 
because it allows an offender to pay the debt to society and then return to 
society, theoretically free of guilt and stigma.”193  
 A final rationale for punishment under the retributive theory is 
denunciation, where “punishment should be an expression of societal 
 
 
187 W. Hastie, From Immanuel Kant, Science of Right (1790), AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, 
http://www1.american.edu/dgolash/Kant_on_Punishment.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2016).  
188 See Murtagh, supra note 183.  
189 Id. (Citing C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 104 (Oxford 1987)). 
190 Id. 
191 See Hastie, supra note 187. 
192 See JRANK, supra note 178. 
193 Id. 
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condemnation.”194 The denunciation theory is considered a “hybrid of 
utilitarianism and retribution…[i]t is utilitarian because the prospect of 
being publicly denounced serves as a deterrent…[and] retributive because 
it promotes the idea that offenders deserve to be punished.”195 In his Science 
of Right, Kant states: 
Yet the attack committed on the honor of the party aggrieved may 
have its equivalent in the pain inflicted upon the pride of the 
aggressor, especially if he is condemned by the judgment of the 
court, not only to retract and apologize, but to submit to some 
meaner ordeal, as kissing the hand of the injured person. In like 
manner, if a man of the highest rank has violently assaulted an 
innocent citizen of the lower orders, he may be condemned not only 
to apologize but to undergo a solitary and painful imprisonment, 
whereby, in addition to the discomfort endured, the vanity of the 
offender would be painfully affected, and the very shame of his 
position would constitute an adequate retaliation after the principle 
of "like with like."196 
 
 B. Consequentialist Theory and Utilitarianism  
 
 In addition to the retributive theory of punishment, the 
consequentialist theory of punishment “views punishment as justified to the 
extent that its practice achieves…whatever end-state the theorist specifies, 
such as the public interest, the general welfare, [or] the common good.”197 
Contrary to deontological theories of punishment, a theory is 
consequentialist in nature if forward-looking, or ex ante, considerations 
prevail over backward-looking, or ex post, considerations.198  
 One type of consequentialist theory of punishment is utilitarianism. 
According to the utilitarian theory of punishment, “the rightness or 
wrongness of an action is determined by the balance of good over evil that 
is produced by that action.”199 Utilitarianism is based on the belief that “laws 
should be used to maximize the happiness of society [and] [b]ecause crime 
and punishment are inconsistent with happiness, they should be kept to a 
minimum.”200 Although utilitarian philosophers such as John Stuart Mill 
and Jeremy Bentham acknowledge that a crime-free society does not exist, 
they “endeavor to inflict only as much punishment as is required to prevent 
 
 
194 Id. 
195 Id. See below for further discussion on the utilitarian theory of punishment and deterrence.  
196 See Hastie, supra note 187. 
197 See STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 181. 
198 See id. 
199 See Murtagh, supra note 183. 
200 See JRANK, supra note 178. 
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future crimes.”201  
Utilitarianism is consequentialist in nature because it “recognizes that 
punishment has consequences for both the offender and society and holds 
that the total good produced by the punishment should exceed the total 
evil.”202 For example, if punishing an offender would produce a higher 
balance of happiness over unhappiness compared with another available 
option, such as public denunciation or not taking any action at all, then 
punishment is justified. However, if the opposite is true, then such other 
option is preferable and punishment is not justified. Utilitarian philosophers 
take into account “every consequence of a given punishment insofar as it 
affects the balance of happiness over unhappiness.”203 
The utilitarian theory of punishment “seeks to punish offenders to 
discourage, or ‘deter,’ future wrongdoing.”204 Punishment is considered to 
have a deterrent effect “when the fear or actual imposition of punishment 
leads to conformity.”205 Deterrence is based on a “rational conception of 
human behavior in which individuals freely choose between alternative 
courses of action to maximize pleasure and minimize pain.”206 Two types 
of deterrence are specific and general deterrence. Specific deterrence 
involves “the effectiveness of punishment on that particular individual’s 
future behavior…[and] [r]ecidivism rates…are often used to measure the 
specific deterrent value of punishments.”207 Furthermore, specific 
deterrence incapacitates an offender so as to “physically prevent [him or] 
her from committing another crime for a specified period…[and] this 
incapacitation is designed to be so unpleasant that it will [in theory] 
discourage the offender from repeating [his or] her criminal behavior.”208 
General deterrence inquires “whether the punishment of particular offenders 
deters other people from committing deviance…[and] [a] comparison of 
crime rates over time or across jurisdictions is typically used to ascertain the 
general deterrent value of punishment.”209 Moreover, general deterrence 
signifies that the “punishment serves as an example to the rest of society, 
and it puts others on notice that criminal behavior will be punished.”210  
 
 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 See Murtagh, supra note 183.  
204 See JRANK, supra note 178. 
205 See WORDPRESS, supra note 184, at 20. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 See JRANK, supra note 178. 
209 See WORDPRESS, supra note 184, at 21. 
210 See JRANK, supra note 178. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
284 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 10:257 
 
 
 A final rationale for the utilitarian theory of punishment is 
rehabilitation.211 The ultimate goal of rehabilitation is to “restore a 
convicted offender to a constructive place in society through some 
combination of treatment, education, and training”212 and thus “prevent 
future crime by giving offenders the ability to succeed within the confines 
of the law.”213 Contrary to the retributive theory of punishment, 
rehabilitation “focuses on the particular characteristics of individual 
offenders that require treatment and intervention.”214 Rehabilitation is 
utilitarian in nature in that it affords judges and other officials discretion to 
“tailor punishments for the greatest good to the individual offender.”215 
 
V. SOLUTION: IMPLEMENT A “TWO-STRIKE” PENALTY SYSTEM FOR 
POSITIVE PED TESTS 
 
 To combat the increasing prevalence of PEDs in baseball, MLB should 
heighten the severity of punishments for positive drug tests by 
implementing a “two-strike” penalty system: a one-year suspension without 
pay for first-time offenders and a lifetime ban from MLB for second-time 
offenders. 
 Section 7A of the Program, which sets forth the disciplinary provisions 
for drug offenders,216 should be amended to develop a more stringent drug 
policy. First, instead of imposing an eighty-game suspension for first-time 
offenders,217 MLB should suspend first-time offenders for a one-year 
period, including the All-Star Game and the entire postseason, without pay. 
Second, instead of imposing a 162-game suspension with a pay suspension 
of 183 days for second-time offenders,218 MLB should impose a lifetime 
ban on second-time offenders, thereby reducing the number of “strikes” for 
PED violations in Section 7A from three to two.  
 There are several justifications for adopting a two-strike drug policy. 
First, adopting an automatic “one-strike” policy that imposes a lifetime ban 
for first-time offenders may be too harsh because the language of Section 
7A suggests that a player, who successfully appeals his suspension by 
proving the affirmative defense that he bore no fault or negligence for the 
presence of the PED in his test result, still receives his first “strike,” 
 
 
211 See id. 
212 See WORDPRESS, supra note 184, at 22.  
213 See JRANK, supra note 178. 
214 See WORDPRESS, supra note 184, at 23. 
215 Id. 
216 See Major League Baseball’s Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program, supra note 8, at 
37. 
217 See id. at 37-38.  
218 Id. 
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notwithstanding a potential reduction in his suspension. The reasoning 
behind this policy is likely intended to encourage players to take greater 
precautions when putting substances into their bodies. On the other hand, 
one may argue that implementing a “one-strike” policy is still feasible, as 
Section 7A could be amended to state that a player who successfully proves 
the affirmative defense does not receive a reduction in his suspension, but 
rather, merely avoids incurring his one “strike.” However, under such a 
policy, a player who, for example, successfully proves the affirmative 
defense in three different positive drug tests could be regarded as abusing 
the system, but he would not receive his one “strike.” Second, a one-year 
ban without pay will incentivize first-time offenders to take additional 
precautionary steps to ensure that the products they put into their bodies are 
appropriate and safe, knowing that a second positive drug test will result in 
a lifetime ban. Finally, a more stringent two-strike drug policy will further 
demonstrate to fans, players, and the rest of society that MLB is dedicated 
to maintaining the integrity of baseball and protecting all players’—both 
professional and amateur—long-term health, thus affirming MLB’s 
commitment to demonstrate to all athletes that “the use of [PEDs] is illegal, 
it is cheating, it does long-term damage to an athlete’s health, and it puts at 
risk an athlete’s reputation and integrity.”219 Therefore, a two-strike system 
is more appropriate than a three-strike system because players will be 
incentivized to take greater health precautions when putting substances into 
their bodies, players will feel the increased financial constraints associated 
with lengthier suspensions without pay, and players will be further deterred 
from engaging in socially undesirable behavior that could lead to forfeited 
roster posts, negative publicity, and possible arbitration or litigation. 
 
A. Application of Philosophical Theories of Punishment 
to PED Usage 
 1. Retributive Theory 
 
 Under the retributive theory of punishment, philosophers such as Kant 
would posit that players who use PEDs have upset the peaceful balance of 
MLB’s competitive fairness and threatened the integrity of the game.220 
Consequently, punishment in the form of yearlong suspensions and lifetime 
bans will demonstrate to society that such deceitful and immoral conduct 
will not be tolerated. Furthermore, because players possess the ability to 
exercise their free will when deciding whether or not to consume PEDs, 
 
 
219 See Selig, supra note 18, at 107. 
220 See JRANK, supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
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players who have transgressed the Program’s provisions by deliberately 
using PEDs deserve to be punished because they consciously chose to gain 
an unfair advantage over other players.221 Such offenders have victimized 
and caused suffering to those players who chose to adhere to the Program’s 
stipulations but subsequently lost roster spots or potential wages to players 
who wrongfully developed augmented offensive capabilities by using 
PEDs.222 Therefore, to equate the punishment with the crime, offenders 
should lose their roster spots and potential wages by serving unpaid 
yearlong suspensions and lifetime bans.223  
According to Kant’s principle of equality, offenders not only inflict 
suffering upon other law-abiding players, but also “upset the balance of the 
scale of justice…and therefore rendered [themselves] deserving of 
suffering.”224 Additionally, under Kant’s principle of retaliation, offenders’ 
wrongful actions, which displace innocent players from club rosters, are to 
be “regarded as perpetrated on [the offenders themselves],”225 which 
justifies imposing year-long suspensions and lifetime bans upon such 
offenders. Furthermore, because the punishment should be based on the 
moral gravity of the offense,226 using PEDs to cheat one’s way to garnering 
awards, fame, and money is a serious moral offense that warrants 
punishment.  
In addition, under the retributive theory of punishment, punishing PED 
offenders serves to protect the legitimate rights of both society and 
offenders.227 For example, society shows its respect for offenders’ free will 
through punishment in the form of suspensions and lifetime bans, and 
punishment shows respect for the offender because it allows him to pay his 
debt to society by sitting out for an entire year without pay before returning 
to MLB (for first-time offenders) or for life (for second-time offenders).228 
Finally, imposing yearlong suspensions and lifetime bans on offenders 
has a denunciative effect. Because suspensions and lifetime bans are 
expressions of societal condemnation,229 these forms of punishment send a 
message to society that players who violate the Program deserve to be 
punished for their wrongful conduct. Furthermore, the prospect of being 
publicly denounced serves as a deterrent for players who value upholding 
their reputation and integrity and maintaining their salaries, sponsorships, 
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and roster spots.230 In effect, suspensions and lifetime bans cause offenders 
to internalize the pecuniary costs of their immoral conduct in the form of 
foregone salaries and sponsorship deals, as well as reputational costs in the 
form of negative publicity, forfeited roster spots, and possible arbitration or 
litigation.  
2. Consequentialist Theory 
 
Under the consequentialist theory of punishment, utilitarian 
philosophers such as John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham would argue 
that the balance of good over evil that is produced by a player’s decision to 
use PEDs determines the rightness or wrongness of such action.231 
Furthermore, because punishing offenders has consequences for both the 
offending player and society, the total good produced by the punishment 
should outweigh the total evil, as punishment should only be inflicted to the 
extent that it prevents future violations of the Program.232  
Several alternatives exist for punishing players who violate the 
Program. First, the player may be publicly reprimanded in the form of a 
monetary fine. However, because MLB players rank among the highest-
paid athletes in the world, a fine may fail to adequately deter offenders’ 
wrongful conduct in the future and may be regarded as a mere slap on the 
wrists. Second, there is the option of not taking any action at all in response 
to a player’s positive drug test. A failure to act would not only exacerbate 
the problem of PED use by encouraging further consumption of PEDs 
among professional and adolescent athletes, but also stand in stark contrast 
to MLB’s commitment to demonstrate to society that “the use of [PEDs] is 
illegal, it is cheating, it does long-term damage to an athlete’s health, and it 
puts at risk an athlete’s reputation and integrity.”233 Lastly, players may be 
punished in the form of yearlong suspensions without pay and lifetime bans. 
These forms of punishment are justified in that they maximize overall 
societal welfare, serve the public interest and common good, and produce 
the highest balance of happiness over unhappiness234 for the following 
reasons.  
First, by suspending players for one year without pay for a first-time 
violation of the Program and imposing a lifetime ban for a second violation, 
such forms of punishment would discourage professional and adolescent 
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athletes from using PEDs and promote the use of safe, appropriate, and legal 
training methods to achieve success.235 In addition, by publicly condemning 
and denunciating the use of PEDs, these forms of punishment would 
adequately deter offenders from engaging in such wrongful behavior in the 
future. The fear of a potential lifetime ban from MLB would cause first-time 
offenders to scrupulously conform to the Program’s requirements and may 
result in a decreased rate of recidivism.236 Consequently, these forms of 
punishment would have a high specific deterrent value. Furthermore, such 
punishment would have a specific deterrent effect by incapacitating first-
time offenders in the form of a one-year suspension without pay and repeat 
offenders in the form of a lifetime ban.237 Additionally, such punishment 
would have a high general deterrent value by serving as an example to the 
rest of society that using PEDs will not be tolerated, thus putting others on 
notice that such behavior will be punished.238 Moreover, a more stringent 
drug policy in MLB will further demonstrate to the millions of adolescent 
athletes and fans that cheating one’s way to achieve success by gaining an 
unfair advantage over others is socially unacceptable behavior and severely 
punishable.  
Finally, and most importantly, punishment in the form of suspensions 
and lifetime bans protects adolescent athletes’ long-term health. Because 
younger athletes tend to emulate their favorite athletes’ behavior,239 
adolescent athletes may be more likely to refrain from purchasing PEDs on 
the black market and will instead resort to using safe and acceptable 
nutritional and training methods if they observe their professional 
counterparts engaging in and promoting the same conduct. Since they are 
subject to significant hormonal changes associated with puberty,240 
adolescent athletes who use PEDs like steroids and hGH are increasingly 
vulnerable to developing serious health complications such as psychiatric 
problems, cardiovascular damage, liver damage, thyroid damage, changes 
to their reproductive systems, musculoskeletal injury, overgrowth of bone 
and connective tissue, and even cancer.241 However, a more stringent drug 
policy in MLB that heightens the severity of punishments associated with 
the use of PEDs among professional athletes would have the effect of 
protecting not only the integrity of baseball, but also the long-term health of 
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adolescent athletes who look up to their professional role models.  
 
VI. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES AND ISSUES MAY ARISE FROM A “TWO-
STRIKE” SYSTEM 
 
 Despite the potential benefits associated with increasing the severity of 
punishments for PED offenders, there are several possible challenges and 
issues that may arise from implementing a “two-strike” penalty system. 
 First, the collective bargaining process of convincing the MLBPA to 
agree to more stringent punishments for PED violations may entail 
increasingly difficult and time-consuming negotiations between club 
owners and the MLBPA. On November 30, 2016, prior to the expiration of 
the pre-existing collective bargaining agreement on December 1, 2016, 
MLB and the MLBPA agreed to a “new five-year labor agreement that will 
allow play to continue uninterrupted through the 2021 season.”242 Among 
the various changes to the new collective bargaining agreement include 
increases in the number of in-season and off-season urine and blood tests 
administered to players with respect to the Program.243 Furthermore, the 
new agreement contains increased punishments for Stimulants violations 
under Section 7B of the Program244 to “[fifty] games for a second time 
violation; [one hundred] games for a third time violation, and up to a 
permanent suspension for a fourth time violation.”245 However, it is 
important to note that the new collective bargaining agreement does not 
contain any changes in the punishments for PED violations under Section 
7A of the Program.  
Nevertheless, one change in the new collective bargaining agreement 
may encourage the MLBPA to agree to increased punishments for PED 
violations during the next round of collective bargaining set to occur in 
2021: the “[a]rbitration [p]anel will be provided more discretion to reduce 
penalties based on mitigating circumstances.”246 Since players can have 
 
 
242 Details of MLB, MLBPA Labor Agreement, MLB.COM (Dec. 2, 2016), 
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their suspensions reduced if they present “clear and convincing” objective 
evidence that the presence of the PED in their specimens was not due to 
their “fault or negligence” under Sections 8(B)(3) and 8(B)(4) of the 
Program,247 providing the arbitration panel with enhanced discretion to 
reduce penalties based on mitigating circumstances may facilitate the 
MLBPA’s consent to heightened punishments for PED violations, because 
players may be more likely to receive reduced suspensions in their 
arbitration proceedings upon appealing their punishments.  
Second, more stringent punishments for PED violations may have 
negative effects on fan attendance at MLB games. If clubs’ best-performing 
players are given lengthier suspensions in the form of a one-year suspension 
or a lifetime ban, fans may be discouraged from attending ballgames if they 
are unable to see their favorite athletes compete for such an extended period 
of time. Consequently, a drop in ballpark attendance could lead to a resultant 
reduction in ticket revenues, concessions and club merchandise sales, 
television ratings, and the probability of a club making the postseason, 
which could exacerbate frustration among a club’s fan base and adversely 
affect a club’s profitability. Furthermore, disgruntled parents may decide 
not to take their children to baseball games if clubs’ players have been 
suspended for using PEDs, possibly because they do not want to expose 
their children to such harmful products or reward these clubs by purchasing 
game tickets. One counter-argument to this potential challenge is the fact 
that MLB’s total fan attendance actually spiked during the Steroid Era, due 
in part to fans’ desire to experience firsthand the excitement of seeing 
bigger, faster, and stronger players hitting more homeruns at significantly 
greater distances and at higher speeds off the bat. For example, total fan 
attendance increased during the Steroid Era from over forty-six million fans 
in 1985 to over seventy-two million fans in 2000 to approximately seventy-
three million fans in 2016.248 Thus, if fans were less interested in attending 
games when they know that they will not have the excitement of seeing 
stronger players hitting more homeruns, then this would present a challenge 
for imposing more stringent punishments for PED usage. 
Finally, if MLB further restricts professional players’ use of PEDs by 
heightening the severity of punishments for PED violations, there is the 
potential danger that online suppliers of PEDs and other dubious 
supplements may shift their focus to selling their products to the teenage 
and pre-teenage markets. With the increased ease and availability of 
purchasing steroids and other PEDs on the Internet, teenagers are vulnerable 
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to being exposed to online merchants’ marketing efforts on the black market 
and purchasing illegal products, some of which have been found to contain 
“contaminants such as lead and other heavy metals; liquid mixers such as 
cooking oil, horse urine; and other filthy contents and dangerous 
substances.”249 Furthermore, countless online vendors promote their 
products to the general public by broadcasting videos on popular websites 
such as YouTube and search engines like Google that contain embedded 
links to their individual websites, where teenagers can purchase these 
harmful products without a prescription simply by using a credit card.250 In 
addition to online retailers, laboratories and clinics like Biogenesis251 have 
provided PEDs not only to professional athletes, but also to “high school 
and college athletes as well.”252 Therefore, if leagues like MLB increase the 
severity of punishments for PEDs and further crack down on professional 
players’ use of PEDs, then “suppliers may become even more dependent on 
the teen market,”253 which could pose serious threats to the safety and long-
term health of adolescent athletes. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Since the beginning of the Steroid Era in the 1980s, MLB has 
experienced a widespread prevalence of PED use among its players. By 
exploring the evolution of MLB’s drug policy, discussing examples of 
players accused of using PEDs, examining statistical information regarding 
adolescents’ use of PEDs, reviewing the retributive and consequentialist 
philosophical theories of punishment including Kantianism and 
utilitarianism, proposing a “two-strike” solution for PED offenders, and 
identifying possible challenges and issues associated with this solution, this 
Note has argued that MLB should adopt a more stringent drug policy than 
the one currently set forth in the Program in order to maintain the integrity 
of baseball and protect adolescents’ long-term health by further 
discouraging the use of PEDs. Failure to address this alarming issue may 
result in more of our nation’s youth and future generations developing life-
threatening health complications at earlier stages in their lives. Now is the 
time for MLB to step up to the plate. 
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